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What is the optimal tax on capital when agents differ in wealth and
income profiles? In this thesis, I develop a model of agent heterogeneity to
consider optimal Ramsey taxation of labor, capital and consumption. When
the only source of heterogeneity is initial wealth, and abstracting from the
initial confiscation, the optimal tax on capital is zero, provided some relevant
elasticities are constant. When, instead, differences are also in terms of
labor characteristics, it may, in general, be desirable to use capital taxes.
This follows from the imperfection of the tax system, resulting from the
restriction that the same income tax must be levied on the different types
of labor. This is then related to the findings of the representative agent
literature with incomplete set of instruments. The results suggest that labor
differences may provide a strong rational in favor of using capital taxes.
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Resumo
Qual é o nível óptimo de tributação de capital quando os agentes diferem
em termos de riqueza e perfis de rendimento? Nesta tese, é desenvolvido um
modelo de agentes heterogéneos para considerar tributação óptima de traba-
lho, capital e consumo, numa estrutura de Ramsey. Quando a única fonte
de heterogeneidade é o nível de riqueza, e abstraindo do confisco inicial, o
imposto óptimo sobre rendimentos de capital é zero, se as elasticidades re-
levantes forem constantes. Quando as diferenças se reflectem também em
termos de características de trabalho pode, em geral, ser desejável usar im-
postos sobre o capital. Isto resulta das imperfeições do sistema fiscal, que
são uma consequência da restrição de tributar ambos os trabalhos à mesma
taxa de imposto. Estes resultados são comparados a resultados da litera-
tura de agente representativo com um conjunto incompleto de instrumentos
fiscais. As conclusões sugerem que diferenças em termos das características
do trabalho dos agentes poderão ser um argumento a favor da utilização de
impostos sobre o capital.
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1 Introduction
The results of Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986) on optimal taxation of capital
have been puzzling economists for the last 30 years. Working in different
settings, they come to the same conclusion that it is optimal not to tax
capital in the steady state.
Chamley (1986) uses an infinitely-lived representative agent model and
assesses the efficiency consequences of imposing a tax on capital. In every
period, the representative household can decide how much to work, consume
and save in public bonds or capital. There are only capital and labor income
taxes and, to prevent expropriatory effects, an upper bound on capital tax-
ation is imposed. He concludes that the optimal tax on capital income is
asymptotically zero, when the economy converges to an interior steady state.
In a model with capitalists and workers, Judd (1985) analyzes the issue of
agent heterogeneity and redistribution. The paper concludes that in a steady
state, the inefficiency associated with capital income taxation would always
outweigh the gains from redistributing, and therefore capital should not be
taxed.
The result of Judd (1985) is especially striking. It strongly suggests that
the thorough elimination of capital taxation in the steady state increases
welfare for all agents, even for those that do not invest in capital. This result
obviously clashes with the common perception of the redistributive role of
taxes.
For this reason, a branch of the literature has focused on understanding
the effects of eliminating the tax on the distribution of income. Correia
(2010), in particular, shows that the elimination of capital income taxation
coupled with consumption taxes not only improves efficiency but can also
improve the distribution in the economy.
More recently, Straub and Werning (2015) have shown that both Judd’s
and Chamley’s models may present, under some conditions, permanent cap-
ital taxation. Their analysis in Chamley’s model focuses on the relevance of
the upper-bound constraints on capital income taxes and provides conditions
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under which those bind forever. In their analysis of Judd (1985), Straub and
Werning show that, for certain specifications of preferences, the optimal path
for taxation of capital may be increasing forever.
Chari, Nicolini and Teles (2016) argue that the assumptions on what the
planner can do in time zero are especially important. They show that if
the planner is restricted in the initial confiscation, the Chamley-Judd result
resurges. This is done by setting the value of initial holding to an exogenous
value. The same constraint can be found in Armenter (2008). I follow the
same approach in limiting the initial confiscation.
As a benchmark case, I review the case of Chari, Nicolini and Teles (2016)
in which the two agents only differ in the initial endowment. Should cap-
ital taxes be used to tax the wealthy? The conclusion is that, if not for
confiscation, capital taxes should be set to zero.
I then proceed to consider that the households also differ in the type
of labor they supply, assessing the relevance of the two sources of hetero-
geneity in the optimal taxation of capital. When there is a restriction of
non-discrimination and the two labor types must be taxed at the same rate,
it will, in general, be optimal to tax capital to try to overcome the constraint.
Nevertheless, I provide conditions under which this tax should not be used,
always abstracting from the initial confiscation. When lump-sum redistribu-
tion is available, and preferences are separable and isoelastic in consumption
and labor, the tax on capital should be set to zero, meaning that the planner
will choose not to distort the intertemporal margins. Constant intratemporal
wedges are imposed. If those lump-sum transfers do not exist, the capital
tax may be used for redistribution.
Furthermore, under certain conditions on the production function, the
wedge on the intertemporal margin for consumption should be set to zero.
These are conditions under which taxing capital will not affect the allocations
in labor.
The fact that there may be restrictions on how the labor income tax
may be used for different types of labor is especially relevant. It is linked
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to the ideas of incomplete factor taxation in Correia (1996), who shows that
if there is a third factor of production which may not be directly taxed,
capital taxation may be used to overcome the restriction. It is also related
to Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1997), in which two different labor types, in
a representative agent setting, must be taxed at the same rate. Reis (2011)
also considers a model in which a representative agent supplies two different
types of labor. Nevertheless, the second labor, entrepreneurial labor, has to
be taxed at the same rate as capital. She shows that this restriction will
justify positive capital taxation. I review and compare these results.
The analysis in this thesis, as in the literature discussed above, is re-
stricted to optimal policies with linear tax schemes, under a Ramsey frame-
work.1 The Social Planner will be thought of as maximizing a Paretian
Welfare function. The tax system is assumed to have taxes on consumption,
capital and labor.
The thesis proceeds as follows: Section 2 introduces the model of agent
heterogeneity. Section 3 uses the model to compute optimal policy. Initially,
I abstract from heterogeneity in labor and consider the redistributive purpose
of taxation. Then, it is shown that, in general, capital taxation should be
used when different types of labor are restricted to being taxed at the same
rate. Section 4 relates the results to the analysis of Correia (1996), Jones,
Manuelli and Rossi (1997) and Reis (2011). Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
To study the case of optimal taxation under heterogeneity, I consider two
different households indexed by 𝑖. Households differ in terms of the initial
endowment of wealth and the type of labor that they supply.
1For a treatment of the theory of Ramsey taxation in Dynamic Representative Agent
Economies, see Chari and Kehoe (1999) or Lucas and Stokey (1983).
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2.1 Households
Each household 𝑖 has infinite horizon and decides, each period, how much






𝑡), where 𝑐𝑖𝑡 is the consumption of the household
and 𝑛𝑖𝑡 is the amount of labor supplied. The utility function is assumed to
be separable in consumption and labor. In particular, I assume the following


















The household starts period 𝑡 with capital, 𝑘𝑖𝑡, and bonds, 𝑏𝑖𝑡. It rents
capital to firms, earning the rental rate 𝑈𝑡,3 capital income is taxed at the
rate 𝜏 𝑘𝑡 , with an allowance for depreciation, 𝛿. The interest rate on a one-
period bond bought at time 𝑡− 1 is given by 𝑟𝑏𝑡 . The household also supplies
labor, earning net income (1 − 𝜏𝑛𝑡 )𝑤𝑖𝑡, where 𝜏𝑛𝑡 is the tax on wage income,
and decides how much to consume, being taxed at the rate 𝜏 𝑐𝑡 . In every







𝑡+1 ≤ (1−𝜏𝑛𝑡 )𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑖𝑡+[1+(1−𝜏 𝑘𝑡 )(𝑈𝑡−𝛿)]𝑘𝑖𝑡+(1+𝑟𝑏𝑡 )𝑏𝑖𝑡, ∀𝑡 ≥ 1.
(2)
Period zero’s constraint is different. The household is endowed with a
level of bonds, 𝑏𝑖0, and capital, 𝑘𝑖0 and an initial levy, 𝑙0, may be raised on the
initial wealth. Furthermore, a transfer, which may be positive or negative,











+ T𝑖0(1 + 𝜏 𝑐0). (3)
2Each household is also assumed to have the same utility function.
3The capital of each household is a perfect substitute in production to that of the other
family, implying the rental rate of capital is the same.
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Furthermore, the household must verify a no-Ponzi games condition. Let
𝑄𝑡 ≡ 1(1+𝑟𝑏1)...(1+𝑟𝑏𝑡 ) and 𝑄0 ≡ 1 and using a non-arbitrage condition between






(1 + 𝜏 𝑐𝑡 )𝑐
𝑖
𝑡 − (1− 𝜏𝑛𝑡 )𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑖𝑡
]︀
≤ (1− 𝑙0)W𝑖0 + T𝑖0(1 + 𝜏 𝑐0), (4)
where W𝑖0 ≡
[︀
[1 + (1− 𝜏 𝑘0 )(𝑈0 − 𝛿)]𝑘𝑖0 + (1 + 𝑟𝑏0)𝑏𝑖0
]︀
.





1 + 𝜏 𝑐𝑡
1 + 𝜏 𝑐𝑡+1
[1 + (1− 𝜏 𝑘𝑡+1)(𝑈𝑡+1 − 𝛿)], ∀𝑡 ≥ 0, (5)
𝑢𝑐𝑖(𝑡)
𝑢𝑛𝑖(𝑡)




, ∀𝑡 ≥ 0, (6)
[1 + (1− 𝜏 𝑘𝑡 )(𝑈𝑡 − 𝛿)] = 1 + 𝑟𝑏𝑡 , ∀𝑡 ≥ 1. (7)
Furthermore, the intertemporal budget constraint is satisfied with equality.
2.2 Firms
There is a representative firm that transforms capital, 𝐾𝑡, and the different
labor types, 𝑛1𝑡 and 𝑛2𝑡 , into units of goods, according to the production
function





in which 𝐹 is the Constant Returns to Scale (CRS) production function. A
particular specification of this production function will have both labor types
being perfect substitutes.
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The profit maximizing conditions imply that the remuneration of factors
is equal to their marginal productivity.4
𝑈𝑡 = 𝐹𝐾(𝑡), (9)
𝑤𝑖𝑡 = 𝐹𝑛𝑖(𝑡), 𝑖 = 1, 2. (10)
In this economy, with a CRS production function, profits are zero.
2.3 The Government
The government taxes the households to finance a stream of public expendi-
tures {𝐺𝑡}∞𝑡=0. The tax instruments available to the government in each pe-
riod 𝑡 are proportional capital income, consumption and labor income taxes.
Furthermore, the government is able to raise a tax on initial wealth, 𝑙0. The
government starts every period 𝑡 with an initial level of debt gross of interest
payments, 𝐵𝑡(1+ 𝑟𝑏𝑡 ), and it can issue debt maturing next period, 𝐵𝑡+1. The




























An important characteristic of the heterogeneity problem is limiting the
availability of discriminatory taxation. This imposes that when choosing
optimal policies, the planner cannot set taxes individually and must always
consider the impact over all agents of imposing any specific tax. During this
thesis the analysis is restricted to non-discriminatory proportional taxes.
The reason for non-discrimination comes from the idea that tax systems
should not distinguish on the basis of who the agents are, as this may present
4The firm is thought of as being able to differentiate between agents, therefore it is
able to set a different wage to each worker.
6
an impossible task either politically or operationally. I, therefore, impose that
all agents should have an equal treatment in terms of taxation.5
The only discriminatory tax instrument is the initial redistributive trans-
fer. However, to limit lump-sum taxes the transfers must sum out to zero.
When considering discriminatory lump-sum transfers the purpose will be to
separate efficiency from redistributive concerns.
2.4 Market Clearing
In equilibrium all markets must clear, implying the following conditions,
respectively, for the markets of goods, capital, bonds6
2∑︁
𝑖=1














In a competitive equilibrium, households maximize utility, taking prices as
given and subject to their budget constraint. Firms maximize profits, taking
prices as given and subject to the production function. The government
verifies its budget constraint. Finally, markets clear.
A competitive equilibrium is a sequence for allocations, prices and taxes,
such that, given 𝑘𝑖0, 𝑏𝑖0, for 𝑖 = 1, 2, 𝑟𝑏0, the following conditions are satisfied:
5A branch of literature has researched the discrimination of agents based on endogenous
decisions and the problem of private information on optimal taxation. An analysis of this
type of issues can be found in Stiglitz (1987).





1 + 𝜏 𝑐𝑡
1 + 𝜏 𝑐𝑡+1























𝑐𝑖𝑡 − (1− 𝜏𝑛𝑡 )𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑖𝑡
]︀
= (1− 𝑙0)W𝑖0 + T𝑖0(1 + 𝜏 𝑐0), (19)
[1 + (1− 𝜏 𝑘𝑡+1)(𝐹𝐾(𝑡+ 1)− 𝛿)] = 1 + 𝑟𝑏𝑡+1, (20)
T10 + T20 = 0 (21)
𝑐1𝑡 + 𝑐
2




𝑡 ) + (1− 𝛿)𝐾𝑡, (22)
where W𝑖0 ≡ [1 + (1− 𝜏 𝑘0 )(𝐹𝐾(0)− 𝛿)]𝑘𝑖0 + (1 + 𝑟𝑏0)𝑏𝑖0, and 𝑄𝑡 ≡ 1(1+𝑟1)...(1+𝑟𝑡)
and 𝑄0 ≡ 1.
The Government’s budget constraint is left out and is satisfied if all these
are satisfied, according to Walras’ Law.
3 Optimal Fiscal Policy
3.1 The First Best
In this section I describe the first best for the economy. The planner chooses
the optimal allocations to maximize a Paretian welfare function, i.e. a
weighted average of utilities. Define 𝜔1 and 𝜔2 as the weights given to house-
hold 1 and 2, respectively, such that 𝜔1 + 𝜔2 = 1 and 𝜔𝑖 ≥ 0.
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The first best is the solution to the problem of maximizing social welfare
subject to the resource constraints, (22). Let 𝛽𝑡𝜇𝑡 be the multipliers of those
constraints. The necessary conditions for optimality are
𝜔𝑖𝑢𝑐𝑖(𝑡) = 𝜇𝑡, (23)
𝜔𝑖𝑢𝑛𝑖(𝑡) = −𝜇𝑡𝐹𝑛𝑖(𝑡), (24)
𝜇𝑡 = 𝜇𝑡+1(𝐹𝐾(𝑡+ 1) + 1− 𝛿). (25)









conditions that the agents face the same marginal prices and taxes are always
verified in this solution. The planner’s first best sets the marginal rates equal
across agents. Also, the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution is equal
to the return on capital investment, 𝑢𝑐𝑖(𝑡)
𝛽𝑢𝑐𝑖(𝑡+1)
= 𝐹𝐾(𝑡+ 1) + 1− 𝛿.
Furthermore, the ratio of marginal utilities of consumption, in each pe-





is the weight given to one of the agents, the higher will the consumption of
that agent be relatively to the other.
How can the first best be implemented? In the literature considering a
single agent, if there are lump-sum taxes the first best is always achievable,
as these allow to finance expenditures without any other costs. When consid-
ering an economy populated by more than one agent, a simple lump-sum tax
treating all agents equally does not achieve the same result. This is because
the planner needs to be able to discriminate to perform redistribution.
The possibility of redistributive tools allows for a separation of efficiency
and equity concerns. The problem of achieving higher efficiency becomes
independent of the question of which agents are benefiting and which are
losing from those policies.
Furthermore, if the conditions for Gorman Aggregation (GA) are met,
the aggregates are also independent of the redistribution performed. The
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combination of the assumptions of GA and redistributive tools are the con-
ditions under which a single agent may be considered. Since the aggregates
are not affected by redistribution of wealth in the economy, we can consider
the optimization for aggregate allocations on a single agent economy, i.e. a
representative agent. The solution may always lead to a Pareto improvement.
This can be analyzed more in depth in Appendix 6.4.
The economy considered here will not, however, always verify the as-
sumptions of Gorman Aggregation. Therefore, I will continue to explicitly
consider the population of two heterogeneous agents.
3.2 Implementability Conditions
The unavailability of lump-sum taxes imposes constraints on policy. The
planner will then have to set up distortionary taxation to finance government
expenditures, as well as the initial level of debt. I seek to understand whether
differences in initial wealth levels or labor types justify capital taxation to
improve the wealth distribution in the economy.
Following the primal approach to dynamic Ramsey taxation, the budget







𝑡 ] = 𝑢𝑐1(0)
(1− 𝑙0)W10








𝑡 ] = 𝑢𝑐2(0)
(1− 𝑙0)W20
1 + 𝜏 𝑐0
− 𝑢𝑐2(0)T10. (27)





















𝑡 ) + (1− 𝛿)𝐾𝑡. (30)
The first two conditions, (28) and (29), result from the fact that the two
agents face the same taxes, therefore the relevant marginal rates of substitu-
tion must be equated for the two agents. (30) are the resource constraints.
Proposition 1. The implementable set for consumption and labor for both
agents and capital, as well as 𝜏 𝑐0 , 𝜏 𝑘0 , 𝑙0 and T10 is characterized by the con-
straints (26), (27), (28), (29) and (30).
Proof. To show that the conditions are necessary is simple. The conditions
were derived using the equilibrium conditions and must, therefore, be verified.
Following the primal approach, as in Lucas and Stokey (1983) or Chari and
Kehoe (1999), (26) and (27) represent the budget constraints with the prices
and taxes replaced by the marginal conditions for optimality. (28) and (29)
result from the fact that agents face the same prices and marginal taxes and
(30) is the market clearing condition in the goods markets. To argue that
they are sufficient conditions, we must show that all other conditions can be
satisfied by other variables. To see this, notice that condition (15) can be
satisfied by some consumption tax 𝜏 𝑐𝑡+1, given 𝜏 𝑐𝑡 . (16) is imposed. (17) is
satisfied by some 𝜏𝑛𝑡 and (18) is imposed. The budget constraint for each
individual, (19), is imposed. (20) can find some 𝑟𝑏𝑡+1 and (22) is imposed.
Finally, the constraint that transfers add up to zero, (21), can be satisfied
by some T20.
Corollary 1.1. The implementation of the optimal solution needs not use
the tax on capital, implying it can always be set to zero, 𝜏 𝑘𝑡 = 0.
The reason for this corollary is that the consumption tax can replace the
use of the income tax in the intertemporal margin. The zero taxation of
capital is to be interpreted as a zero wedge in that margin.
I now proceed to solve the Ramsey problem in steps. First, I discuss
the initial confiscation, in line with the approach of Chari, Nicolini and Teles
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(2016). I then proceed to compute optimal taxation with labor homogeneity;
this part is, to a large extent, a review of their results. Finally, I proceed to
solve the problem for the case in which labor is heterogeneous.
3.3 Time Zero
Ramsey problems are characterized by time inconsistency. In period zero
there is no previous commitment, but the government perfectly commits to
a path for policies from then on.
The treatment the planner would like to do to the outstanding wealth in
period zero is different from the one in all other periods, because taxation
for that exogenous level of wealth is non-distortionary. The planner wishes
to minimize distortions, and taxing that initial wealth is very tempting.
To prevent full initial expropriation, Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985)
imposed constraints on the capital income taxes. But the inclusion of the
upper bound raises a new problem, that of using future capital income taxes
to tax the initial stock of wealth. While Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985)
assumed that these effects would be only transitory, and the steady state
analysis would be free from confiscatory intents, Straub and Werning (2015)
provide examples on how the upper bound may bind forever in the model of
Chamley and in an hybrid model in which they consider Judd’s framework
with unconstrained government debt.
As shown by Chari, Nicolini and Teles (2016) there are better alterna-
tives to the initial confiscation, instead of full capital taxation. They show
that with consumption taxes, the planner will choose a relatively high con-
sumption tax for 𝑡 = 1, compared to 𝑡 = 0, and this will be enough to deal
with the initial confiscation. If capital income taxes were unconstrained, the
same could be achieved with the capital income tax in 𝑡 = 1. However, once
constrained it is possible that the needed tax is too high and the constraint
is binding forever.
To prevent these initial effects, I impose a restriction on how much the





1 + 𝜏 𝑐0
W𝑖0 = U𝑖0. (31)
This is the same restriction that is imposed in Chari, Nicolini and Teles
(2016). It is also present in the work of Armenter (2008), who argues that this
makes the optimal allocations being dependent only on current conditions,
which is interpreted as being “timeless”.
Nevertheless, the results would be kept the same if instead the constraints
were imposed in the initial taxes, 𝜏 𝑐0 , 𝜏 𝑘0 and 𝑙0. In that case the consumption
tax in 𝑡 = 1 would be higher than that of 𝑡 = 0, to be able to affect the value of
initial holding. Since the consumption tax is unconstrained, it would always
solve the problem.
3.4 Optimal Taxation with Labor Homogeneity
The model provides a framework to analyze optimal policy when agents differ
in initial wealth. For now, assume that labors are perfect substitutes. The
production function is given by 𝐹 (𝐾𝑡, 𝑁𝑡), in which 𝑁𝑡 ≡ 𝑛1𝑡 + 𝑛2𝑡 . Since
the goal is analyzing whether capital should be taxed for the purpose of
redistribution, the initial transfers are eliminated, as those transfers would
always be a better instrument.
The planner maximizes a Paretian welfare function. Let 𝜆𝑖 be the mul-
tiplier of the budget constraints, respectively for 𝑖 = 1, 2. Define 𝛽𝑡𝜂𝑐𝑡 and
𝛽𝑡𝜂𝑛𝑡 to be the multipliers of (28) and (29), respectively. Finally, let 𝛽𝑡𝜇𝑡 be
the multiplier on the resource constraints.
Theorem 1 (Chamley (1986), Judd (1985)). In the two agent economy,
when the labor of both agents are perfect substitutes, if the Ramsey solution
converges to an interior steady state, capital should not be taxed in that steady
state.
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Proof. The first order condition of the Ramsey problem with respect to cap-
ital accumulation is given by
𝜇𝑡 = 𝛽𝜇𝑡+1(1− 𝛿 + 𝐹𝐾(𝑡+ 1)).
If 𝜇𝑡 → 𝜇 and 𝐾𝑡 → 𝐾, then the condition is in the limit
1− 𝛿 + 𝐹𝐾 = 1/𝛽.
Since in a competitive equilibrium the steady state must have, from the
combinations of (15), (17) and (20) , that
1 + 𝜏 𝑐𝑡
1 + 𝜏 𝑐𝑡+1




[1 + (1− 𝜏 𝑘𝑡+1)(𝐹𝐾 − 𝛿)] = 1/𝛽.
This means that there should be no wedge in the intertemporal margins in
the steady state. Therefore, a possible implementation keeps the taxes on
labor and consumption constant and sets a zero tax on capital in the steady
state.
Theorem 1 echoes the results of both Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986).
If the economy converges to an interior steady state capital should not be
taxed.
Proposition 2 shows that this result of zero taxation of capital can actually
be obtained away from the steady state provided elasticities are constant.
The proof can be found in the appendix.
Proposition 2. In the two agent economy, when the labor of both agents are
perfect substitutes, if the relevant preference elasticities are constant, then
the optimal plan does not distort any of the intertemporal margins, implying
that a possible implementation sets taxes on labor and consumption constant
over time, with a zero tax on capital income.
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When the elasticities for consumption are constant, the marginal rate of
intertemporal substitution for consumption should not be distorted. This
is due to the fact that, with constant elasticities, uniform taxation of con-
sumption in each period is optimal. Therefore, the planner does not want
to distort intertemporally. The implication is that if the consumption tax is
constant, the tax on capital income should be set to zero. Furthermore, if
preferences are such that the elasticity of labor is also constant, none of the
intertemporal margins should be distorted, i.e. capital should not be taxed.
The agents in this economy differ only in the amount of initial wealth.
The conclusion is that taxation should not be used for wealth redistribution.










. That implies that the planner would want more
redistribution, but in the second best it is not optimal to do so.
In the appendices, I study four other alternatives for redistributive in-
struments in this economy and show that, just as in the one I have chosen to
present here, capital should never be taxed. Appendix 6.3.1 assumes that an
unconstrained transfer to one of the agents exists. This is the framework most
comparable to the first model of Judd (1985), as he assumed that a lump-sum
transfer to workers existed. Then, Appendix 6.3.2 considers the case in which
this transfer is constrained to being non-negative, while still maintaining its
discriminatory characteristic. Then, Appendix 6.3.3 considers the case in
which the transfer has to be given to both agents on a non-discriminatory
basis, to show that, once more, capital should not be taxed. Finally, Ap-
pendix 6.3.4 considers the case in which the transfer is unconstrained but
non-discriminatory, to show that even though distortionary taxation will be
used, capital should not be taxed. Unconstrained discriminatory transfers
to both agents are not considered, as those would just lead to the first best.
Constrained discriminatory transfers are also not explicitly considered. This
is because the planner is only interested in sending transfers to the relatively
poorer agent,7 and, as a consequence, the transfer to the richer agent would
7Also considering the weights of each agent.
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be zero.
This suggests that the reason for the results in Straub and Werning (2015)
is the initial confiscation. If confiscation is limited, the optimal plan will
always have zero taxation of capital. Why? Being unable to confiscate more,
the best policy for the planner is not to distort the intertemporal choice,
because doing so leads to lower accumulation of capital, reverting towards
labor productivity.
It is optimal to set a constant wedge in the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and labor. However, constant elasticities imply that
the optimal solution does not distort intertemporally either consumption or
labor.
3.5 Optimal Taxation with Heterogeneous Labor
How should policy be conducted when agents differ both in initial wealth and
labor types? A key issue is the imperfection in the tax system. Taxes are
restricted to be non-discriminatory. In this linear tax system, that means
that both labor types must be taxed at the same rate. In general, these
imperfections may justify the use of capital taxation as a correction measure.
The planner maximizes a Paretian welfare function. Let 𝜆𝑖 be the mul-
tiplier of the budget constraints, respectively for 𝑖 = 1, 2. Define 𝛽𝑡𝜂𝑐𝑡 and
𝛽𝑡𝜂𝑛𝑡 to be the multipliers of (28) and (29), respectively. Finally, let 𝛽𝑡𝜇𝑡 be
the multiplier on the resource constraints.
3.5.1 With Initial Redistribution
Let us first analyze how policy should be when there are discriminatory lump-
sum transfers. The goal is to keep the analysis based on efficiency concerns
rather than redistribution. In this setup, if labor types are perfect substitutes,
capital should not be taxed. This is the case even if agents differ in terms of
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efficiency.8 However, when the different types are not substitutes, in general,
the capital income tax may be used to partially overcome the restriction that
they have the same tax rate.
In order for capital income taxes to be used to correct the tax imperfec-
tion, two conditions are needed. The first is that capital taxes are able to
affect the allocations in labor. As shown later, this depends on the char-
acteristics of the production function and on how each labor interacts with
capital.
The second condition is whether the optimal plan would set different
wedges on the margins for each labor. If the optimal plan is to have constant
distortions for the different types, constraining the economy to an homoge-
neous tax does not involve a welfare loss.
Proposition 3. In the two agent economy with heterogeneous labor, in which
the planner is constrained to set the same tax on both labor types, if the
Ramsey problem converges, capital taxation is, in general, used.














Which in a steady state implies a wedge between pre-tax return on capital
and the intertemporal margin:















8In the appendix I discuss how optimal policy, under the assumption of Gorman Ag-
gregation, can be understood from a representative agent framework when agents differ in
efficiencies.
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The case with labor heterogeneity is significantly different from that in
which agents supply the same type of labor. The restriction of setting the
same proportional tax on both types may justify the use of capital taxes even
in the steady state. This can be easily seen from the extra term in equation
(33). Being, in general, different from zero it implies an optimal third best
distortion on the intertemporal margin for consumption, which is a sufficient
condition to argue that capital should be taxed in this setting.
The extra term can be studied to understand for which cases the in-
tertemporal margin should not be distorted. One condition for this holds
whenever the planner would optimally set the same intratemporal wedge for
both agents. This would imply that 𝜂 = 0 and thus the intertemporal margin
would not be distorted.
Another condition to have no distortion in the intertemporal margin, is
when the difference inside parenthesis is zero. If an absolute increase in
the capital stock leads to the same proportionate growth in productivity for
each type of labor, it holds true. Under such conditions, a distortion in
the intertemporal margin for consumption would not have any effect on the
allocations for each labor, and thus it should be optimally set to zero.
Proposition 4. In the two agent economy, if types of labor are heterogeneous
but the production function is weakly separable in labor types, 𝐹 (𝐾𝑡, 𝑁(𝑛1𝑡 , 𝑛2𝑡 )),
consumption should not be distorted intertemporally.

















𝜇𝑡 = 𝛽𝜇𝑡+1(1 + 𝐹𝐾(𝑡+ 1)− 𝛿).
A Cobb-Douglas production function on the three arguments, for exam-
ple, verifies the assumption of Proposition 4. However, for a general CES
production function the assumption is not valid.
The result of non-zero capital taxation when the set of tax instruments
is restricted is similar to the result in the representative agent economies of
Correia (1996) or Reis (2011). However, these two settings only consider
labor and capital income taxes. There, the introduction of consumption
taxes recovers the complete set of instruments and the asymptotic zero tax
on capital.
This is not true when the tax imperfection is setting the same tax to
different labor types. Indeed, when the tax system has a restriction of this
sort, the consumption tax cannot help overcoming the constraint, because it
cannot be independently used to target the extra margin. This also applies
to the representative agent framework of Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1997),
as will be discussed in Section 4.
Nevertheless, for the particular case of preference specifications we have
been considering, in which utility is isoelastic both in consumption and labor
and equal across agents, the planner will not tax capital income. This result
is independent of the production function, as is stated in Proposition 5.
Proposition 5. In the two agent economy with heterogeneous types of labor,
and preferences which are separable in consumption and labor and isoelastic
in each, if initial redistribution is allowed, capital should not be taxed, and
the multipliers on constraints (28) and (29) are zero.
The proof can be found in the appendix.
The intuition for the result is straightforward. Since both agents have
the same constant elasticity of consumption and labor the planner wants to
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set the marginal rates of each agent equal, which then implies that the con-
straints (28) and (29) are verified in the optimal solution. It echoes a similar
argument for uniform taxation of sources of income in a representative agent
setting, discussed in the next section. Therefore, when lump-sum transfers
are available, the planner chooses not to distort any of the intertemporal
margins, implying capital should not be taxed. For other preference specifi-
cations, with variable elasticities, capital may be taxed, as long as elasticities
remain different across agents, even if constant.
3.5.2 Without Initial Redistribution
Should capital taxation be used even if elasticities are constant but when
there are no transfers to perform the needed redistribution? Clearly, when-
ever the production function verifies the assumptions of Proposition 4, capital
taxation needs not be used to distort the intertemporal consumption margin.
Nevertheless, for general production functions the capital tax may be
used even if agents have the same constant elasticities. This can be easily
seen from the dependence of the proof of Proposition 5 on the availability of
initial transfers.
Proposition 6. In the two agent economy with heterogeneous labor types,
and preferences which are separable in consumption and labor and isoelastic
in each, it is, in general, optimal to use capital taxation.
Whenever the planner does not have lump-sum redistributive tools, the
conditions to tax capital may be met, even when elasticities are constant.
This is because the planner would like to tax more one of the agents, sug-
gesting that strong differences in labor characteristics may justify the use of
capital taxes to perform redistribution.
3.6 Judd (1985) and Straub and Werning (2015)
How do these findings relate to Judd (1985) and Straub and Werning (2015)?
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Judd (1985) first suggested that capital should not be taxed in the steady
state for reasons of redistribution. The first model of Judd (1985) considers
the case in which there are two classes of agents: workers and capitalists.
Capitalists make decisions on how much to consume and save, but do not
supply labor. On the other hand, workers supply labor inelastically. They
are also excluded from participating in the assets market and, therefore, live
hand-to-mouth.
Capital is taxed and a lump-sum transfer/tax is set on workers. In this
setting all taxes are discriminatory, taxing capital will only tax capitalists and
the lump-sum transfer only targets workers. Furthermore, the government
cannot hold assets/debt, i.e. the government must run a balanced budget.
Judd (1985) shows that if the economy converges to an interior steady state,
the capital income tax should converge to zero.
Nevertheless, Straub and Werning (2015) show that, when the intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution is below one, the optimal path for these taxes
is increasing forever, and the economy does not converge to an interior steady
state. The intuition provided is that, with these preference characteristics,
the income effect dominates the substitution effect. Therefore, promising
higher future capital taxes decreases the consumption of capitalists, which in
their case is desirable since the planner is only concerned with the consump-
tion of the worker.
In order to understand these results, the hypothesis on the initial con-
fiscation are essential, as shown by Chari, Nicolini and Teles (2016). When
considering heterogeneous agents the problem becomes even more extreme.
Since the problem with restricted government debt is less clear, consider
first the hybrid model presented by Straub and Werning (2015), with uncon-
strained government debt. Define agent 1 as being the capitalist and agent
2 the worker. The planner is only concerned with the worker, which implies
that the weight of capitalists is zero.
Suppose that the initial levy is restricted to allow the capitalist to have a
given amount of wealth, i.e. (1−𝑙0)
1+𝜏𝑐0
([1+(1−𝜏 𝑘0 )(𝑈0−𝛿)]𝐾0+(1+𝑟𝑏0)𝐵0) ≥ 𝑊0.
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𝛽𝑡𝑢𝑐1(𝑡)𝑐𝑡 = 𝑢𝑐1(0)𝑊0. (34)
To the planner, capitalist’s consumption is a cost, because, everything else
equal, it decreases the amount of worker’s consumption. As argued by Straub
and Werning (2015), reducing the consumption of capitalists is desirable.
As shown in their work, for 𝜎 > 1, promising higher future taxes will
decrease consumption of the capitalist in all periods. Therefore, the planner
can eliminate the capitalist’s consumption by promising infinite capital taxes
in period 1, while respecting (34), and maximizing the welfare of workers.
This is taxing the initial amount of wealth, in the sense of reducing the
relative valuation of that wealth today.
Suppose that the initial levy was unrestricted. Setting 𝑙0 = 1 would
achieve exactly the same effect, and would be optimal for any level of 𝜎. The
government would confiscate the whole amount of wealth, act as a saver and
smooth out transfers to workers.
How will the optimal policy differ if, instead, the government cannot issue
debt? Note that in the setting discussed, the government can borrow and
lend in order to smooth transfers to workers. However, when the government
must run a balanced budget, it is unable to do so. For instance, if the
government were to fully tax the initial endowment of capitalists, the only
possibility would be to increase the consumption of workers in period 0. In
that setup, capitalists are the only savings technology.
It is the interconnectedness of the desire to expropriate initial holdings
with the impossibility of government savings that makes the problem signif-
icantly different from the previous one.
We can then conclude that the model with capitalists and workers and
unconstrained government debt yields similar results to the model in which
both agents work and save. The participation constraints, in the assets or
labor markets, do not change the conclusions. The reason to tax capital is
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the initial expropriation. In the model with a balanced budget, the dynamics
become significantly different, however the ideas remain.
4 On the Incompleteness of the Set of Instru-
ments
In the analysis before I assumed that the two types of labor had to be taxed
at the same rate. This is a restriction on the tax system which in a rep-
resentative agent framework, in general, corresponds to an incomplete set
of instruments, as discussed in Chari and Kehoe (1999). In this section I
discuss this and other such restrictions and how consumption taxes may re-
cover the complete set of instruments. I am going to assume that there is a
representative household, which is allowed to have a third factor of produc-
tion (interpreted as a different labor). I consider unrestricted taxes on labor,
capital and consumption and abstract from the initial confiscation effects.
Correia (1996) develops a model in which a third factor of production is
used but cannot be taxed by the government. The consequence of having
too few instruments in the tax system justifies a long-run capital tax (or
subsidy).
A different situation occurs if the third factor has to be taxed at the same
rate as some other source of income. The planner has to choose a common
tax on both factors. Reis (2011) considers such a case. In her model there
is a second labor, entrepreneurial labor, which has to be taxed at the same
rate as capital. This justifies a positive long-run tax on capital.
I show that these results will change if taxes on consumption are consid-
ered. The intuition is as follows: while taxes on capital and labor are taxes
on sources of income, the consumption tax targets the use of all wealth. As
such, it can be used to target all income sources, even the extra one. This
has the potential to correct the imperfection of the tax system.
However, for this to be true, it must be that the consumption tax is an
independent instrument. This means that the planner has to be able to use
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the consumption tax to independently affect the extra margin.
If the third factor of production has to be taxed at the same rate as
labor, consumption taxes provide no further improvement because they are
not independent of the tax on labor. This last example is, in fact, the rep-
resentative agent analog to the model developed with two different types of
labor in the previous section.
4.1 A Third Factor that Cannot be Taxed
Correia (1996) restricts the tax system instruments to be able to target only
two of the three sources of income. In this model the introduction of con-
sumption taxes can be an improvement.
Following Correia (1996), but allowing for consumption taxes the house-




𝛽𝑡𝑈(𝐶𝑡, 𝑁𝑡,ℑ𝑡), 𝑠.𝑡. (35)
(1+𝜏 𝑐𝑡 )𝐶𝑡+𝐾𝑡+1+𝐵𝑡+1 ≤ [1+(1−𝜏 𝑘𝑡 )(𝑈𝑡−𝛿)]𝐾𝑡+(1−𝜏𝑛𝑡 )𝑤𝑡𝑁𝑡+𝑠𝑡ℑ𝑡+(1+𝑟𝑡)𝐵𝑡,
together with a terminal condition. The production function is CRS using
all three inputs, and thus 𝑤𝑡 = 𝐹𝑁(𝑡), 𝑈𝑡 = 𝐹𝐾(𝑡) and 𝑠𝑡 = 𝐹ℑ(𝑡). This




1 + 𝜏 𝑐𝑡
1 + 𝜏 𝑐𝑡+1
[1 + (1− 𝜏 𝑘𝑡+1)(𝐹𝐾(𝑡+ 1)− 𝛿)], (36)
𝑈𝐶(𝑡)
𝑈𝑁(𝑡)
















𝑡 )𝐶𝑡 − (1− 𝜏𝑛𝑡 )𝐹𝑁(𝑡)𝑁𝑡 − 𝐹ℑ(𝑡)ℑ𝑡] = W0, (39)
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1 + 𝑟𝑡+1 = 1 + (1− 𝜏 𝑘𝑡+1)(𝐹𝐾(𝑡+ 1)− 𝛿), (40)
𝐶𝑡 +𝐺𝑡 +𝐾𝑡+1 = 𝐹 (𝐾𝑡, 𝑁𝑡,ℑ𝑡) + (1− 𝛿)𝐾𝑡. (41)
where W0 ≡ [1 + (1− 𝜏 𝑘0 )(𝐹𝐾(0)− 𝛿)]𝐾0 + (1+ 𝑟0)𝐵0, and 𝑄𝑡 ≡ 1(1+𝑟1)...(1+𝑟𝑡)
and 𝑄0 ≡ 1.
The implementability condition can be written as
∞∑︁
𝑡=0




Proposition 7. The set of implementable allocations can be described by (41)
and (42). These are the necessary and sufficient conditions for an equilibrium
in the quantities and initial tax on capital.
Proof. To show that they are necessary notice that they are obtained from
the equilibrium conditions. In fact (42) is the budget constraint with the
prices replaced by the marginal conditions of households and firms. To show
that they are sufficient, notice that all other conditions can be satisfied by
other variables: (36) by a tax on capital 𝜏 𝑘𝑡+1, (37) by 𝜏𝑛𝑡 , and (38) by 𝜏 𝑐𝑡 .
(39) and (41) are imposed. (40) can be satisfied by some 𝑟𝑡+1.
Following standard results in Ramsey literature, to avoid uninteresting
solutions, think of the initial tax on capital as being set at some exogenous
level.
The set of implementable allocations is defined by the implementability
condition plus the resources constraint. This is what characterizes a Ramsey
problem with a complete set of instruments. While without consumption
taxes the benevolent planner will choose to use the tax on capital income to
also target the extra production factor, once consumption taxes are intro-
duced, the planner can use these to tax all income sources and correct for
the needed margins with the other taxes.
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Proposition 8. In the model of Correia (1996), in which a third factor of
production cannot be taxed, and considering the existence of consumption
taxes, the tax on capital income converges asymptotically to zero.
Proof. The first order conditions of the planner’s problem of maximizing the
agents utility subject to (41) and (42), with respect to 𝐶𝑡, 𝑁𝑡, ℑ𝑡 and 𝐾𝑡+1
are, respectively,
𝑈𝐶(𝑡)[1 + 𝜆(1− 𝜎𝐶𝐶(𝑡)− 𝜎𝑁𝐶(𝑡)− 𝜎ℑ𝐶(𝑡))] = 𝜇𝑡,
𝑈𝑁(𝑡)[1 + 𝜆(1− 𝜎𝑁𝑁(𝑡)− 𝜎𝐶𝑁(𝑡)− 𝜎ℑ𝑁(𝑡))] = −𝜇𝑡𝐹𝑁(𝑡),
𝑈ℑ(𝑡)[1 + 𝜆(1− 𝜎ℑℑ(𝑡)− 𝜎𝐶ℑ(𝑡)− 𝜎𝑁ℑ(𝑡))] = −𝜇𝑡𝐹ℑ(𝑡),
𝜇𝑡 = 𝛽𝜇𝑡+1(1− 𝛿 + 𝐹𝐾(𝑡+ 1)),
where 𝜆 denotes the multiplier on (42), and 𝛽𝑡𝜇𝑡 the multiplier on constraint
(41), in each period. Furthermore 𝜎𝑥𝑦(𝑡) ≡ −𝑈𝑥𝑦(𝑡)
𝑈𝑦(𝑡)
𝑥𝑡.











1 + 𝜆(1− 𝜎ℑℑ − 𝜎𝐶ℑ − 𝜎𝑁ℑ)
1 + 𝜆(1− 𝜎𝐶𝐶 − 𝜎𝑁𝐶 − 𝜎ℑ𝐶)
. (44)
(44) implies that 𝜏 𝑐𝑡 → 𝜏 𝑐, and then (43) implies that 𝜏 𝑘𝑡 → 0.
We can conclude that if consumption taxes are available to the planner
it is not optimal to distort intertemporally. In this setup, consumption taxes
are constant and the capital tax should be set to zero when elasticities are
constant.
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4.2 A Third Factor Taxed at the Same Rate as Capital
Suppose that the third source of income can be taxed. However this must
be done at the same rate as one of the remaining factors of production. This
is the problem of Reis (2011) or Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1997). Consider
first that the income of factor ℑ𝑡 is taxed at the same rate as capital and
consumption taxes are available.




𝛽𝑡𝑈(𝐶𝑡, 𝑁𝑡,ℑ𝑡), 𝑠.𝑡. (45)
(1+𝜏 𝑐𝑡 )𝐶𝑡+𝐾𝑡+1+𝐵𝑡+1 = [1+(1−𝜏 𝑘𝑡 )(𝑈𝑡−𝛿)]𝐾𝑡+(1−𝜏𝑛𝑡 )𝑤𝑡𝑁𝑡+(1−𝜏 𝑘𝑡 )𝑠𝑡ℑ𝑡
+(1 + 𝑟𝑡)𝐵𝑡,
together with a terminal condition. The production function is CRS using
all three inputs, and thus 𝑤𝑡 = 𝐹𝑁(𝑡), 𝑈𝑡 = 𝐹𝐾(𝑡) and 𝑠𝑡 = 𝐹ℑ(𝑡). The




(1 + 𝜏 𝑐𝑡 )
(1 + 𝜏 𝑐𝑡+1)
[︁












= − 1 + 𝜏
𝑐
𝑡






𝑡 )𝐶𝑡 − (1− 𝜏𝑛𝑡 )𝐹𝑁(𝑡)𝑁𝑡 − (1− 𝜏 𝑘𝑡 )𝐹ℑ(𝑡)ℑ𝑡] = W0, (49)
1 + 𝑟𝑡+1 = 1 + (1− 𝜏 𝑘𝑡+1)(𝐹𝐾(𝑡+ 1)− 𝛿), (50)
𝐶𝑡 +𝐺𝑡 +𝐾𝑡+1 = 𝐹 (𝐾𝑡, 𝑁𝑡,ℑ𝑡) + (1− 𝛿)𝐾𝑡, (51)
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where W0 = (1+ (1− 𝜏 𝑘0 )(𝐹𝐾(0)− 𝛿)𝐾0+(1+ 𝑟0)𝐵0), and 𝑄𝑡 ≡ 1(1+𝑟1)...(1+𝑟𝑡)
and 𝑄0 ≡ 1.
The implementability condition can be written as
∞∑︁
𝑡=0
𝛽𝑡[𝑈𝐶(𝑡)𝐶𝑡 + 𝑈𝑁(𝑡)𝑁𝑡 + 𝑈ℑ(𝑡)ℑ𝑡] = −
𝑈ℑ(0)W0
(1− 𝜏 𝑘0 )𝐹ℑ(0)
. (52)
Proposition 9. The set of implementable allocations can be described by
(51) and (52). These are the necessary and sufficient conditions for for an
equilibrium in the quantities and initial tax on capital.
Proof. To show that they are necessary notice that they are obtained from
the equilibrium conditions. In fact (52) is the budget constraint with the
prices replaced by the marginal conditions of households and firms. To show
that they are sufficient, notice that all other conditions can be satisfied by
other variables: (46) by a capital tax 𝜏 𝑘𝑡+1, (47) by 𝜏𝑛𝑡 , and (48) by 𝜏 𝑐𝑡 . (49)
and (51) are imposed. (50) can be satisfied by some 𝑟𝑡+1.
The same result of Proposition 8 is applicable in this case. Therefore,
capital should not be taxed in the steady state.
4.3 A Third Factor Taxed at the Same Rate as Labor
Consider, instead, that the income of factor ℑ𝑡 has to be taxed at the same
rate as labor and consumption taxes are available.




𝛽𝑡𝑈(𝐶𝑡, 𝑁𝑡,ℑ𝑡), 𝑠.𝑡. (53)
(1+𝜏 𝑐𝑡 )𝐶𝑡+𝐾𝑡+1+𝐵𝑡+1 ≤ [1+(1−𝜏 𝑘𝑡 )(𝑈𝑡−𝛿)]𝐾𝑡+(1−𝜏𝑛𝑡 )𝑤𝑡𝑁𝑡+(1−𝜏𝑛𝑡 )𝑠𝑡ℑ𝑡
+(1 + 𝑟𝑡)𝐵𝑡,
together with a terminal condition. The production function is CRS using
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all three inputs, and therefore 𝑤𝑡 = 𝐹𝑁(𝑡), 𝑈𝑡 = 𝐹𝐾(𝑡) and 𝑠𝑡 = 𝐹ℑ(𝑡). The




(1 + 𝜏 𝑐𝑡 )
(1 + 𝜏 𝑐𝑡+1)
[︁




















𝑡 )𝐶𝑡 − (1− 𝜏𝑛𝑡 )𝐹𝑁(𝑡)𝑁𝑡 − (1− 𝜏𝑛𝑡 )𝐹ℑ(𝑡)ℑ𝑡] = W0, (57)
1 + 𝑟𝑡+1 = 1 + (1− 𝜏 𝑘𝑡+1)(𝐹𝐾(𝑡+ 1)− 𝛿), (58)
𝐶𝑡 +𝐺𝑡 +𝐾𝑡+1 = 𝐹 (𝐾𝑡, 𝑁𝑡,ℑ𝑡) + (1− 𝛿)𝐾𝑡, (59)
where W0 = (1+ (1− 𝜏 𝑘0 )(𝐹𝐾(0)− 𝛿)𝐾0+(1+ 𝑟𝑜)𝐵0), and 𝑄𝑡 ≡ 1(1+𝑟1)...(1+𝑟𝑡)
and 𝑄0 ≡ 1.
The implementability condition can be written as
∞∑︁
𝑡=0
𝛽𝑡[𝑈𝐶(𝑡)𝐶𝑡 + 𝑈𝑁(𝑡)𝑁𝑡 + 𝑈ℑ(𝑡)ℑ𝑡] = 𝑈𝐶(0)
W0
1 + 𝜏 𝑐0
. (60)
Furthermore, since no tax instrument can be independently used to im-
pose a wedge in the marginal rate of substitution between labor types, an-
other restriction must be included to the Ramsey problem. This condition is
given by (56). The extra restriction imposed on the planner’s problem means
that the set of instruments is incomplete.
Proposition 10. If there is a third factor of production and its has to be taxed
at the same rate as labor income, then in general the set of implementable
allocations are restricted by (56), (59) and (60). These are the necessary and
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sufficient conditions for an equilibrium in the quantities and initial taxes on
consumption and capital.
Proof. To show that they are necessary notice that they are obtained from
the equilibrium conditions. In fact (60) is the budget constraint with the
prices replaced by the marginal conditions of households and firms. To show
that they are sufficient, notice that all other conditions can be satisfied by
other variables: (54) by a consumption tax 𝜏 𝑐𝑡+1, given 𝜏 𝑐𝑡 , (55) by 𝜏𝑛𝑡 . (56),
(57) and (59) are imposed. (58) can be satisfied by some 𝑟𝑡+1.
Following standard practice in the Ramsey literature, to avoid uninterest-
ing solutions, think of the initial taxes on capital and consumption as being
set at some exogenous level.
In general, condition (56) presents a restriction on the set of imple-
mentable allocations, as no tax instrument can be independently used to
affect this margin in the optimal way. Note that, unlike the previous cases,
the consumption tax cannot help overcoming the restriction. This is what is
meant by not having an independent instrument.
There is a special case for which (56) is not binding. This is when prefer-
ences are weakly separable and homogeneous in labor types: 𝑈(𝐶𝑡, 𝐺(𝑁𝑡,ℑ𝑡)),
where 𝐺 is an homogeneous function. These preferences imply uniform tax-
ation of each labor and therefore the wedge between labor types is optimally
zero. The proof can be found in Appendix 6.5. In this case, restricting the
planning problem to set the same tax on both sources of income has no effect
and therefore the tax on capital should be asymptotically zero, as before.
A special case is when the utility function depends on the sum 𝑁𝑡 and ℑ𝑡.
However, since this does not generally hold, the condition must be included
to the planning problem.
Proposition 11. In the case in which the income of the third factor is re-
stricted to being taxed at the same rate as labor income, in general, capital
income may be subsidized or taxed in the steady state.
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Proof. Let 𝛽𝑡𝜂𝑡 be the multiplier of (56), 𝜆 the multiplier of restriction (57)
and 𝛽𝑡𝜇𝑡 the multiplier of (59). The marginal conditions of the Ramsey
problem for consumption are given by
𝑈𝐶(𝑡)[1 + 𝜆(1− 𝜎𝐶𝐶(𝑡)− 𝜎𝑁𝐶(𝑡)− 𝜎ℑ𝐶(𝑡))] = 𝜇𝑡.







The first order conditions to capital accumulation are given by
𝜇𝑡 = 𝛽
[︁







This shows that the intertemporal margin will, in general, be distorted,







are different from zero.
This representative agent framework is analogous to the problem with
agent heterogeneity. Similar considerations on the production function apply.
The reason to distort the intertemporal margin for consumption is to try to
overcome the restriction that the two types of labor must be taxed at the
same rate. In order for that to be possible it must be that the tax on capital
can affect the two differently.
This result can also be found in Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1997). They
assume that a representative agent supplies two different types of labor but
a single tax rate on labor must be used. Their result also depends on the
assumption that labor types are not perfect substitutes in preferences, such
that uniform taxation is not optimal.
5 Conclusions
Should capital be taxed when agents differ in terms of the amount of initial
wealth and labor characteristics? To answer that question, this thesis devel-
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ops a model assuming two households differing in these characteristics. The
labor of each household is, in general, a different productive input. House-
holds have the same preferences over consumption and labor, being isoelastic
in both arguments.
I derive the equilibrium for this economy and use it to compute opti-
mal fiscal policies. A key issue is that the government does not distinguish
between agents when setting up taxation. As it turns out, for the implemen-
tation of the optimal plans the capital tax is never needed, as time-varying
consumption taxes can be used to distort the intertemporal margin. Capital
not being taxed is to be interpreted as those margins not being distorted.
As a benchmark case, it is shown that, abstracting from the initial levy,
as in Chari, Nicolini and Teles (2016), redistributive capital taxation is not
to be used when the only source of heterogeneity is the size of initial wealth.
Considering that households also differ in their labor characteristics leads
to a different conclusion. This is because the non-discriminatory character-
istics of the tax system imposes that the tax rate on the two different labor
inputs be the same. In general, this inefficiency in the tax system will justify
the use of capital taxation.
Two conditions must be met in order for capital taxation to be optimal.
The first is that the planner would actually want to tax labor types differently.
It is shown that, when there are discriminatory lump-sum transfers, the
planner chooses not to tax capital. This is because the restriction is not
binding, as the optimal solution sets the same wedge in the intratemporal
margin for both agents. However, without these transfers, the planner will
choose to tax capital to redistribute.
In any case, a second condition implies that the distortion on the in-
tertemporal margin for consumption must be able to affect differently each
labor type. This depends on particular conditions on the technology used
in the economy. The planner will, therefore, only raise a wedge on the in-
tertemporal margin for consumption if and only if this helps targeting the
labor types differently, thus helping in overcoming the restriction.
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These results are compared to results of past literature, that derive im-
plications for capital taxation in the presence of restrictions on the taxes.
One such case is Correia (1996), who shows that when a third factor of pro-
duction cannot be taxed it may be optimal to tax capital. As shown here,
the introduction of consumption taxes will allow the planner to tax the third
source of income, overcoming the restriction.
I also consider the case in which the third factor has to be taxed at the
same rate as some other factor, capital or labor. When the tax on capital
and the third factor must be the same, as in Reis (2011), the result that
the steady state taxation of capital is zero is also recovered. Again, this is
because consumption taxes are an independent instrument in that setting.
Instead, when the third factor has to be taxed at the same rate as labor
income (as in Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1997)), I show that the consumption
tax provides no improvement. This is the representative agent analog to the
model of heterogeneity.
The conclusions suggest that the imperfections in the tax system on the
treatment of different types of labor may be an argument in favor of the use
of capital taxes, both for efficiency and redistribution concerns.
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6 Appendices
6.1 Proof of Proposition 2































We can multiply the first equation by 𝑐1𝑡 and the second by 𝑐2𝑡 , and add
both conditions to obtain that
𝑢𝑐1(𝑡)𝑐
1
𝑡 [𝜔1 + 𝜆1(1− 𝜎)] + 𝑢𝑐2(𝑡)𝑐2𝑡 [𝜔2 + 𝜆2(1− 𝜎)] = 𝜇𝑡(𝑐1𝑡 + 𝑐2𝑡 ).
An important characteristic of these preferences is that the equality be-





is constant over time. Define this ratio as 𝛾. We can then
conclude that
𝑢𝑐1(𝑡)[𝜔1 + 𝜆1(1− 𝜎)] + 𝑢𝑐2(𝑡)𝛾[𝜔2 + 𝜆2(1− 𝜎)] = 𝜇𝑡(1 + 𝛾).
Finally, since 𝑢𝑐2(𝑡)𝛾 = 𝑢𝑐1(𝑡)𝛾1−𝜎, this implies that
𝑢𝑐1(𝑡)
[︀
𝜔1 + 𝜆1(1− 𝜎) + 𝛾1−𝜎[𝜔2 + 𝜆2(1− 𝜎)]
]︀
= 𝜇𝑡(1 + 𝛾).





The first order condition to capital accumulation has that the ratio of
multipliers is equal to the pre-tax return on capital
𝜇𝑡
𝜇𝑡+1
= 𝛽(𝐹𝐾(𝑡+ 1) + 1− 𝛿).
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adding both constraints implies the following condition:
𝑢𝑛1(𝑡)
[︀
𝜔1 + 𝜆1(1 + 𝜁) + 𝛾
−𝜎[𝜔2 + 𝜆2(1 + 𝜁)]
]︀
= −𝜇𝑡𝐹𝑁(𝑡)(1 + 𝛾−𝜎/𝜁).







Using these relations it can now be understood that the decentralization
of the optimal plan can be done with constant consumption and labor taxes
and a zero tax on capital. This can be seen from the following conditions
1 + 𝜏 𝑐𝑡
1 + 𝜏 𝑐𝑡+1
[1 + (1− 𝜏 𝑘𝑡+1)(𝐹𝐾(𝑡+ 1)− 𝛿)] = [1 + (𝐹𝐾(𝑡+ 1)− 𝛿)],
1− 𝜏𝑛𝑡
1− 𝜏𝑛𝑡+1
[1 + (1− 𝜏 𝑘𝑡+1)(𝐹𝐾(𝑡+ 1)− 𝛿)] = [1 + (𝐹𝐾(𝑡+ 1)− 𝛿)],
Then a possible implementation has 𝜏 𝑐𝑡 = 𝜏 𝑐 and 𝜏𝑛𝑡 = 𝜏𝑛, with 𝜏 𝑘𝑡+1 = 0.
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6.2 Proof of Proposition 5
Let us guess that the constraints on the marginal rates of substitution are
verified and need not be imposed. Then 𝜂𝑐𝑡 = 𝜂𝑛𝑡 = 0. The first-order
condition with respect to consumption of each individual, from period 1
onwards, are thus given by
𝑢𝑐𝑖(𝑡)[𝜔𝑖 + 𝜆𝑖(1− 𝜎)] = 𝜇𝑡.




for all 𝑡 ≥ 1, and then the
equality between marginal rates of intertemporal substitution is satisfied, i.e.




The first-order condition with respect to labor for every period is given
by
𝑢𝑛𝑖(𝑡)[𝜔𝑖 + 𝜆𝑖(1 + 𝜁)] = −𝜇𝑡𝐹𝑛𝑖(𝑡).




[𝜔1 + 𝜆1(1− 𝜎)]





[𝜔2 + 𝜆2(1− 𝜎)]
[𝜔2 + 𝜆2(1 + 𝜁)]
.
Condition (29) is verified if and only if
𝜔1 + 𝜆1(1− 𝜎)
𝜔1 + 𝜆1(1 + 𝜁)
=
𝜔2 + 𝜆2(1− 𝜎)
𝜔2 + 𝜆2(1 + 𝜁)
Which holds true if







We can now show that this always holds with initial redistribution. The
first order condition with respect to T10 shows that




The first-order conditions to consumption imply that
𝑢𝑐1(𝑡)[𝜔1 + 𝜆1(1− 𝜎)] = 𝑢𝑐2(𝑡)[𝜔2 + 𝛾𝜎𝜆1(1− 𝜎)].
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Which using the fact that 𝑢𝑐2(𝑡)𝛾𝜎 = 𝑢𝑐1(𝑡), shows that indeed, 𝜂𝑛𝑡 = 0.




We have not analyzed the problem of period 0. The first-order conditions
with respect to consumption in period 0 are given by








Then by multiplying by 𝑐𝑖𝑡 each condition and adding both we have that
𝑢𝑐1(0)𝑐
1
0[𝜔1 + 𝜆1(1− 𝜎)] + 𝑢𝑐2(0)𝑐20[𝜔2 + 𝜆2(1− 𝜎)] = 𝜇0(𝑐10 + 𝑐20).
Dividing by 𝑐10 and using the fact that 𝑢𝑐2(0) = 𝛾1−𝜎𝑢𝑐1(0), yields that
𝑢𝑐1(0)[𝜔1 + 𝜆1(1− 𝜎) + 𝛾1−𝜎𝜔2 + 𝛾1−𝜎𝜆2(1− 𝜎)] = 𝜇0(1 + 𝛾).
And using the fact that 𝜔1 = 𝛾−𝜎𝜔2 and 𝜆1 = 𝛾−𝜎𝜆2 we can write that
𝑢𝑐1(0)[𝜔1 + 𝜆1(1− 𝜎)] = 𝜇0.
Furtheremore,
𝑢𝑐2(0)[𝜔2 + 𝜆2(1− 𝜎)] = 𝜇0.




and thus 𝜂𝑐0 = 0.
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6.3 Redistributive Taxation
6.3.1 Unrestricted Discriminatory Transfer
Suppose an unrestricted lump-sum transfer to one of the agents existed (as-
sume without loss of generality it is to agent 2).9 If such is the case the
planning problem is restricted by one less condition - the budget constraint
of agent 2 - because that can be met by this transfer.


























𝑡 ) + (1− 𝛿)𝐾𝑡. (65)
The necessary conditions for optimality, with respect to each consump-































Following the same argument we can see that
𝑢𝑐1(𝑡)
[︀
𝜔1 + 𝜆1(1− 𝜎) + 𝛾1−𝜎𝜔2
]︀
= 𝜇𝑡(1 + 𝛾).









Therefore, if consumption taxes are set constant over time, the capital
tax should be set to zero.
Furthermore, the tax on labor should also be set constant over time. The
first order conditions with respect to each labor, already multiplied by each
labor level, are given by
𝑢𝑛1(𝑡)𝑛
1












Adding both constraints and using the previous relation between marginal
utilities of labor, implies that
𝑢𝑛1(𝑡)
[︀
𝜔1 + 𝜆1(1 + 𝜁) + 𝛾
−𝜎𝜔2
]︀









6.3.2 Restricted Discriminatory Transfer
Suppose, instead, that the lump-sum transfer is restricted to being positive,
but still idiosyncratic to agent 2. This is different from the previous result
because the planning problem will be restricted by the budget constraint of
household 2.



























T20 ≥ 0 (70)
𝑐1𝑡 + 𝑐
2




𝑡 ) + (1− 𝛿)𝐾𝑡. (71)
The necessary conditions for optimality, with respect to each consumption






, ∀𝑡 ≥ 1.
This states that from period one onwards there should be no distortion on
the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution for consumption.
In period zero the condition for consumption of household 1 is exactly
the same (with 𝜂𝑐−1 = 0). However, the first order condition to consumption
of household 2 is somehow different. It is given by
𝑢𝑐2(0)𝑐
2









+ 𝜎𝜆2𝑢𝑐2(0)T20 = 𝜇0.
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The Kuhn-Tucker condition with respect to the choice of T20 is given by:
𝜆2T20𝑢𝑐2(0) = 0.
.
One of two scenarios are possible: (1) T20 = 0 or (2) T20 > 0. (1) immedi-














from which the previous arguments hold exactly. If the transfer is strictly
positive, scenario (2), then 𝜆2 = 0, since 𝑢𝑐2(0) > 0. Under this condition,
the optimal plan has the same characteristics of the optimal plan of 6.3.1,
and thus capital should not be taxed.
43
6.3.3 Restricted Non-Discriminatory Transfer
Suppose that the lump-sum transfer is given to both agents, on a non-
discriminatory way, i.e. both receive the same transfer. Despite its prac-
tical appeal, as one would think that non-discriminatory instruments are
more likely to exist in real economies, this case is more restrictive than the
previous one. It should yield roughly the same results.



























T0 ≥ 0 (76)
𝑐1𝑡 + 𝑐
2




𝑡 ) + (1− 𝛿)𝐾𝑡. (77)
The necessary conditions for optimality, with respect to each consumption






, ∀𝑡 ≥ 1.
This states that from period one onwards there should be no distortion on
the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution for consumption.
In period zero, the necessary conditions for optimality with respect to the
consumption of each household are given by
𝑢𝑐1(0)𝑐
1






















+ 𝜎𝜆2𝑢𝑐2(0)T0 = 𝜇0𝑐20.
Adding both constraints yields the following condition
𝑢𝑐1(0)[𝜔1+𝜆1(1−𝜎)+𝛾1−𝜎[𝜔2+𝜆2(1−𝜎)]]+𝜎T0(𝜆1𝑢𝑐1(0)+𝜆2𝑢𝑐2(0)) = 𝜇0(1+𝛾)
Since the Kuhn-Tucker condition with respect to the transfer shows that
T0(𝜆1𝑢𝑐1(0) + 𝜆2𝑢𝑐2(0)) = 0,
we can rewrite the condition as








implying that capital should not be taxed.
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6.3.4 Unrestricted Non-Discriminatory Transfer
Suppose that this transfer is now unconstrained, meaning it can be a lump-
sum tax. This is the case under which the government has a non-distortionary
tool available. However, since it is not able to discriminate between individ-
uals, the economy cannot, in general, achieve the first-best and distortionary
taxation will be raised to finance the government.

































𝑡 ) + (1− 𝛿)𝐾𝑡. (82)
The necessary conditions for optimality, with respect to each consumption






, ∀𝑡 ≥ 1.
This states that from period one onwards there should be no distortion on
the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution for consumption.
In period zero, the necessary conditions for optimality with respect to the
consumption of each household are given by
𝑢𝑐1(0)𝑐
1






















+ 𝜎𝜆2𝑢𝑐2(0)T0 = 𝜇0𝑐20.
Adding both constraints yields the following condition
𝑢𝑐1(0)[𝜔1+𝜆1(1−𝜎)+𝛾1−𝜎[𝜔2+𝜆2(1−𝜎)]]+𝜎T0(𝜆1𝑢𝑐1(0)+𝜆2𝑢𝑐2(0)) = 𝜇0(1+𝛾)
Since the first-order condition with respect to the transfer shows that
𝜆1𝑢𝑐1(0) + 𝜆2𝑢𝑐2(0) = 0,
we can rewrite the condition as








implying that capital should not be taxed.
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6.4 On Gorman Aggregation
Correia (2010) develops a model of heterogeneous agents that is still amenable
to Gorman aggregation. In that model agents differ both on initial wealth
and labor efficiencies. However, to keep aggregation labor types are still
perfect substitutes.10
In that paper, Correia does not compute optimal policies, but rather
shows that setting the tax on capital income to zero while increasing the
taxes on consumption and labor, increases both efficiency and equity. I seek
to show that in an economy amenable to Gorman aggregation, optimality
can be computed from a representative agent framework if discriminatory
lump-sum transfers exist.
In a Gorman aggregable economy with different labor efficiencies, when-
ever the indirect utility function can be written as
𝑣𝑖(𝑝) = 𝛼(𝑝)𝑔(𝐸𝑖) + 𝛽(𝑝)𝐴𝑖, (83)



















Proposition 12. If the economy is amenable to Gorman Aggregation, and
the indirect utility can be written as 𝑣𝑖(𝑝) = 𝛼(𝑝)𝑔(𝐸𝑖) + 𝛽(𝑝)𝐴𝑖, when dis-
criminatory lump-sum transfers are available the solution to the representa-
tive agent problem can always lead to a Pareto improvement.
Proof. The proof is done in 2 steps. First, I argue that the solution to
the Representative Agent problem can be represented by an increase in the
10In Correia (2010) the market wage is 𝑤𝑡, however the agent’s wage is given by 𝐸𝑖𝑤𝑡,
where 𝐸𝑖 is the measure of labor efficiency for agent 𝑖.
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initial wealth of the agent, and then show that with discriminatory lump-sum
transfers we can find a Pareto improvement.
(a) Equivalent Wealth Increase
Optimality in the representative agent problem, implies that
𝑣(𝑝*) ≥ 𝑣(𝑝′),∀𝑝′ ∈ 𝐹, (85)
where 𝐹 represents the set of feasible price vectors, 𝑝.
We define the equivalent wealth, 𝐴*𝑖 , as the wealth that would yield the
same welfare of 𝑝* at the price vector level of 𝑝′, this implies that
𝑣(𝑝*) = 𝛼(𝑝*)𝐸𝑟 + 𝛽(𝑝
*)𝐴𝑟 = 𝛼(𝑝
′)𝐸𝑟 + 𝛽(𝑝
′)𝐴*𝑟 ≥ 𝛼(𝑝′)𝐸𝑟 + 𝛽(𝑝′)𝐴𝑟.
(85) implies that 𝐴*𝑟 ≥ 𝐴𝑟.
We can find an expression for the equivalent wealth
𝐴*𝑟 =




To show that this can lead to a Pareto improvement, we fix the wealth
of all 𝑁 − 1 first agents to be such that the utility they attain with the
price vector 𝑝* is the same level of utility they had with the alternative
𝑝′. Given this we can show that the utility for the 𝑁 − 𝑡ℎ agent increases.
Therefore, defining by 𝑣*𝑖 the utility for each agent at the price level 𝑝* and















To show that welfare is increased, we need to show the 𝑁 − 𝑡ℎ agent
is better off, (1) 𝐴′𝑁 ≥ 𝐴𝑁 . Furthermore, it must be feasible, hence initial







(1) immediately follows from the fact that 𝐴*𝑟 ≥ 𝐴𝑟, which implies that
the equivalent aggregate wealth increases 𝑁𝐴*𝑟 ≥ 𝑁𝐴𝑟.
To prove (2) we must show that at the final prices, initial wealth does
not increase
𝐴*𝑖 =
(𝛼(𝑝′)− 𝛼(𝑝*))𝑔(𝐸𝑖) + 𝛽(𝑝′)𝐴𝑖
𝛽(𝑝*)
, ∀ 𝑖 = 1, ..., 𝑁 − 1, (89)
𝐴*𝑁 =








(𝛼(𝑝′)− 𝛼(𝑝*))𝑔(𝐸𝑖) + 𝛽(𝑝′)𝐴𝑖
𝛽(𝑝*)
+















By definition of 𝐴′𝑁 , the above equation can be written as
𝑁
(𝛼(𝑝′)− 𝛼(𝑝*))𝐸𝑟 + 𝛽(𝑝′)𝐴*𝑟
𝛽(𝑝*)
= 𝑁










Gorman aggregation does, however, underly a key assumption on how
each agent’s labor efficiency relates to capital. In specific, is implies that an
increase in the capital stock of this economy will lead to the same proportional
increase in all labor productivities.
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6.5 Uniform Taxation of Labor Types
Suppose the utility function of the representative agent is given by
𝑈 = 𝑈(𝐶𝑡, 𝐺(𝑁𝑡,ℑ𝑡))


























𝐺(𝑡) + (𝑘 − 1).
Which implies that
[1 + 𝜆(1− 𝜎𝐶ℑ(𝑡)− 𝜎𝑁ℑ(𝑡)− 𝜎ℑℑ(𝑡))]
[1 + 𝜆(1− 𝜎𝐶𝑁(𝑡)− 𝜎𝑁𝑁(𝑡)− 𝜎ℑ𝑁(𝑡))]
= 1.







implying condition (56) is not binding.
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